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THE STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION: A CRITIQUE
AND A CORPORATE PLANNING ALTERNATIVE
RONALD M. SHAPIRO*
INTRODUCTION
Statutes that accord special recognition to close corporations'
are chiefly characterized by requirements respecting unanimity of
stockholder action,2 restrictions upon the transferability of stock,'
potential elimination of a board of directors,4 relaxation of formali-
* B.A., 1964, Haverford College; J.D., 1967, Harvard University; Partner,
Shapiro & Sachs, P.A.; Lecturer, University of Maryland and University of Baltimore
Schools of Law.
1. Maryland's special statutory treatment for the close corporation is provided
for in MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to 4-603 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
CODE]. This article will sometimes refer to such statute as the "Maryland Act" or
"Title Four." At last count, five other states had provided for special statutory treat-
ment of the close corporation. These states are Delaware (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§
341-56 (1967), Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN., §§ 17-7201 to -7216 (1973)), Pennsylvania
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-86 (1968)), Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.,
§§ 7-1.1-.51 (1969)), and Texas (Tax. Bus. CoP. AcT ANN. art. 2.30-1 to .30-5
(1973)). Significantly, Florida, effective January 1, 1976, has repealed its close cor-
poration statute. This article will refer generally to corporations organized under such
legislative provisions as "statutory close corporations," and to those under Maryland's
Title Four, as "Title Four Corporations."
2. CODE § 4-201 (b) (2) (ii) (requiring affirmative vote of every stockholder for
election to be a Title Four Corporation); id. § 4-203 (affirmative vote of every stock-
holder needed to remove statement of election to be a Title Four Corporation); id.
§ 4-401 (b) (providing for unanimous written consent to amend a stockholders' agree-
ment); id. § 4-501 (issuance or sale of stock must be approved by all of the stock-
holders, unless otherwise permitted by stockholders' agreement); id. § 4-601 (every
stockholder must approve a consolidation, merger, or transfer of assets of a Title Four
Corporation). Affecting all of these unanimity requirements is section 4-504(b) which
provides that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of § 2-104(b) (5) of this article, the
charter of a close corporation may not lower the proportion of votes required to
approve any action for which this title requires the affirmative vote or assent of every
stockholder or every subscriber for stock of the corporation."
3. Id. § 4-503.
4. Id. § 4-302.
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ties,5 and special dissolution provisions. 6 Foremost among the claimed
benefits of close corporation statutes is their authorization of unani-
mous stockholders' agreements which may regulate the affairs of
the corporation and its stockholders. 7
Respected legal authorities have described such statutes as af-
fording novel benefits and flexibility in planning a corporate enterprise
with a limited number of stockholders." These advocates invariably
refer to the ease and simplicity of organizing privately-held corporate
entities under the close corporation statutes.9 The Maryland Act
has been described as representing "one of the most significant steps
toward special recognition and treatment of the close corporation yet
taken by any state."'" As a result of such encomiums, numerous
statutory close corporations have been organized in Maryland since
the adoption of the Maryland Act in 1967.11
5. Id. § 4-402 (stockholders' annual meetings need not be held unless requested
by a stockholder).
6. Id. §§ 4-602 & 4-603.
7. Hall, The New Maryland Close Corporation Law, 27 MD. L. REv. 341, 342
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Hall]. For an example of such authorization, see CODE
§ 4-401.
8. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 7. See also Adickes, A "Closed Corporation Low"
for California, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1990 (1966); Bradley, A Comparative Evaluation
of the Delaware and Maryland Close Corporation Statutes, 1968 DUKE L.J. 525;
Latty, The Close Corporation and the New North Carolina Business Corporation Act,
34 N.C.L. Rxv. 432 (1956).
9. See Hall, at 342, 363-64. Corporations having a limited number of stock-
holders but which have not been organized under special provisions such as Title Four
have generally been referred to as "close" or "privately-held" or "closely-held" cor-
porations. Definition of such corporations is not susceptible to precision. Professor
F. Hodge O'Neal offers the following definition:
The term "close corporation" has been defined in various ways. It is often used
to distinguish and set apart the corporation with only a few shareholders from the
"public issue" or publicly held corporation. Another popular definition states that
a close corporation is a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in the
securities market. One of the few judicial definitions says that the term means
"a corporation in which the stock is held in few hands, or in few families, and
wherein it is not at all, or only rarely, dealt in by buying or selling."
F. HODGE O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 1.01, at 2 n.1 (1975)
(citations omitted). Such corporations, not organized as statutory close corporations,
are sometimes referred to in this article as "privately-held" corporations. In Mary-
land, they are organized in accordance with the general corporation provisions set forth
in CODE, § 2-101 to -611. These statutory provisions are referred to in this article
as the "general corporation law."
10. Hall, supra note 7, at 341; accord, Bradley, supra note 8, at 554.
11. A representative of the Maryland State Department of Assessments and
Taxation has informed the author as of the date of this writing that in excess of 1,100
Title Four Corporations have been filed since its enactment (and that the rate of
filing has increased recently).
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Notwithstanding the chorus of initial praise, and in light of the
burgeoning growth of statutory close corporations, a reexamination
of the practical implications of the premises underlying the enactment
of close corporation statutes would seem to be in order. Practice
under the Maryland Act suggests that its purported advantages may
be more myth than reality. Indeed, nine years of experience with the
problems typically confronting Title Four corporations tends to sup-
port the conclusion that commitment to this business mold may be
largely unrealistic and impracticable in light of the vagaries of human
nature.
This article will seek to balance the scales of understanding re-
specting statutory close corporations. First, it will analyze the dangers
inherent in organizing and operating under statutes like Maryland's
Title Four. Second, it will demonstrate that almost all of the corpo-
rate planning flexibility deemed by some to be possible only under the
aegis of the close corporation statutes is actually afforded by the
provisions of the general corporation law. Finally, a minimal modifi-
cation of the general corporation law will be suggested. This modifica-
tion would inject into that law perhaps the sole practical advantage
now available under Title Four which is not presently available under
the former.
I. CLOSE CORPORATION DANGERS
A business enterprise should not be committed to close corpora-
tion status without a clear understanding of the potential problems
that may arise as a result of that election. Close corporation statutes
tend to reflect an inadequate grasp of the critical role played by the
personalities and private motivations of the participants in any
"small" business. The prime danger is that the Title Four unanimous
stockholders' agreement provisions,' 2 coupled with other built-in
"deadlock" provisions,'" may, as a practical matter, deflect corporate
counsel from cautious planning specifically designed to minimize intra-
corporate stockholder conflict. Moreover, elimination of the tradi-
tional board of directors structure may promote management infor-
malities to a degree that actually exacerbates stockholders' contro-
versies and leads to other potentially adverse consequences.
12. CODE § 4-401. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
13. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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A. Deadlock and the Avoidance of Corporate
Planning Responsibilities
The theme of unanimity is a significant characteristic of close
corporation statutes, including Maryland's Title Four; to proponents
of such statutes, it is perhaps second in importance only to the statu-
tory validation of the stockholders' agreement.14 Actions respecting
each of seven vital corporate matters may be taken, subject to minor
variation, only by the affirmative vote or consent of every stock-
holder.' These matters include the consolidation, merger, and trans-
fer of assets of the corporation, 6 stock issuance,' 7 and certain transfers
of stock."8 Removal from the charter of the "statement of election to
be a close corporation" requires not only unanimous stockholder
approval, but also the approval of "every subscriber for stock of the
corporation."' 9 Furthermore, adoption of amendments to the unani-
mous stockholders' agreement requires the concurrence of all parties
to the agreement.20
For most of the enumerated transactions, the requirement of a
unanimous vote may be varied neither by the corporate charter nor
by the unanimous stockholders' agreement.2 ' Even in those limited
instances where the statute does permit modification, it may have
little practical effect. For example, the statute permits transfers of
stock to certain persons designated in the stockholders' agreement.22
Nevertheless, unless the specific transfer is designated in the stock-
holders' agreement, unanimous stockholder approval must be obtained
at the time that any such transfer is sought to be implemented.3
Similarly, with respect to the matter of a stock issuance, the Maryland
Act requires approval by the holders of all outstanding stock unless
the issuance is permitted by the unanimous stockholders' agreement.24
14. See Hall, supra note 7, passim. See also Comment, Desirability of a "Close
Corporation Act," 52 Nw. U.L. Rv. 397, at 401-02 (1957). Although Professor Hall
does not specify unanimity as second in importance, his article as a whole suggests
such an inference. He does, however, express some reservations respecting unanimity
See notes 26 & 42 and accompanying text infra.
15. CODE § 4-504(b) ; notes 16-20 infra.
16. Id. § 4-601.
17. Id. § 4-501.
18. Id. § 4-503.
19. Id. § 4-203.
20. Id. § 4-401(b).
21. Id. § 4-504(b).
22. Id. § 4-503 (b) (2).
23. Id. §4-503(b) (1).
24. Id. §4-501.
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Assuming that statutory standards for these matters are not, in fact,
modified by the stockholders' agreement at the time of incorporation,
an amendment of the stockholders' agreement at a later date to achieve
such modifications will require the concurrence of all stockholders
party to the agreement.25
In practice, the unanimity requirements respecting stock issuance
and transfer tend not to be modified by stockholders' agreements.26
Perhaps one reason for this is traceable to the contention of Title Four
advocates that such requirements serve as a protection to existing
stockholders against the introduction of new and unwanted "part-
ners." 27 However, this contention ignores the fact that, at a time
subsequent to incorporation, a needed infusion of capital or necessary
skill from a would-be stockholder could be effectively blocked if a
single stockholder were to find the individual personally offensive.
While it is clearly not desirable for incompatible individuals to asso-
ciate in a business enterprise, it should be recognized that the con-
tinued viability of the enterprise may well dictate association with
persons who are approved of by some but not all existing stock-
holders. On the day of incorporation it might appear to be an ad-
vantage to give to each stockholder a veto over future stock issuances.
Nevertheless, at a later date, this veto power may be exercised for
arbitrary or inappropriate personal reasons thus cutting the corpora-
tion off from essential financing or expertise, seriously damaging the
corporation or even bringing about its demise.
For example, assume that a corporation has been organized
to engage in a vital new industry and has less than ten stockholders.
As time passes, it becomes apparent that the corporation will have
to undertake an offering of securities in order to raise needed capital
(and to achieve a cross-section of community interest among its
stockholders2 ). The contemplated sale of securities to additional
25. Id. § 4-401(b).
26. The author made a random sample review of twenty-nine Title Four corpora-
tions by contacting persons named as incorporators in the articles of incorporation
filed with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation. Of those corporations,
twenty-six either had no stockholders' agreement or named no one other than the
initial stockholders as potential transferees. Moreover, even if an attempt were made
to modify the statutory stock issuance requirements, only the most prophetic of persons
could account for all possible contingencies. Professor Hall himself recognizes the
problems inherent in unanimity requirements affecting stock issuance and transfer. See
Hall, supra note 7, at 352-53, 356.
27. Hall, supra note 7, at 348, 352.
28. There may be certain non-corporate law qualifications imposed upon a business
by virtue of its field of endeavor. For example, a criterion considered in granting a
community-wide communications franchise may be that persons representing different
1976]
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stockholders will trigger one of the Title Four unanimity require-
ments.2" Another unanimity provision will come into play because
the close corporation election will have to be removed from the
charter, ° the close corporation commitment to vetoes being totally
alien to operating a business with a dozen stockholders or perhaps
even half that number."' Only one of the corporation's existing
stockholders opposes the admission of new stockholders. Yet his
failure to approve will block the transaction. Significantly, the
obstreperous stockholder's opposition comes neither from disagree-
ment with the corporate policies and goals nor from objections to the
prospective stockholders. Rather, his intransigence stems from his
disagreement with the corporation's management respecting pay-
ments allegedly due him for past services rendered to the corporation.
He refuses to accede to the necessary changes unless his request for
compensation is granted. Because the other stockholders are not in
a financial position to repurchase this stockholder's shares pursuant
to the special close corporation dissolution provision, 2 the corpora-
tion will have no alternative but to succumb to his demands in order
to achieve the business objectives of all the stockholders. This
example highlights the importance an enterprise's original stock-
interests in the community own stock in the corporation. See Two Groups Seek Fran-
chise For Howard Cable TV, The [Baltimore] Sun, Nov. 1, 1972, § C, at 24, col. 7;
Calvert Get County Cable Franchise, The [Baltimore] Sun, Apr. 3, 1973, § A, at 1,
col. 7; Howard CATV Guarantees Asked, The [Baltimore] Sun, Mar. 9, 1973, § C,
at 7, col. 5; CATV Applicant Stresses Local Sale Stock Plan, The [Baltimore]
Evening Sun, Mar. 9, 1973, § C, at 3, col. 6; Howard CATV Franchise Goes to Local
Group, The [Baltimore] Evening Sun, Sept. 5, 1973, § D, at 2, col. 4; Costs, Control
are Issues in Howard CATV Hearings, The [Baltimore] Sun, Mar. 13, 1973, § A,
at 11, col. 1.
29. CODE § 4-501. Even if the stockholders' agreement permitted issuances to
certain named persons, unanimity would still be required respecting an issuance to any
person not so named. See also notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
30. Id. § 4-203.
31. With respect to the workability of unanimity in relation to the number of
stockholders, Professor O'Neal states:
The risk of deadlock of course grows as the number of shareholders increases.
If a corporation is to have more than four or five shareholders, it may be unwise
to give a single shareholder power to veto corporate action. In a corporation with
seven shareholders and a seven man board, for instance, it may be preferable to
set the vote for shareholder and director action in a way which requires con-
currence of two shareholders or directors to effect a veto.
O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 8.09, at 562.
32. CODE § 4-603.
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holders should attach to the implications of the unanimity require-
ments that would be imposed on them by a Title Four election."3
Equally, if not more, limiting than the requirements relating to
stock issuance or transfer is the mandate that a statutory close
corporation cannot at any time undertake such extraordinary corpo-
rate actions as a merger or transfer of assets without the unanimous
approval of all stockholders. 4 While it may be prudent to impose
a unanimity requirement respecting such organic transactions when
only two or three persons own stock in a corporation,3 5 such a re-
quirement may have deleterious consequences when five or ten stock-
holders are involved in an enterprise. In the latter instance a sub-
stantial affirmative vote requirement, requiring approval by two-thirds
or three-fourths of the shares may be preferable to unanimity.
Otherwise, a single dissident minority stockholder in a statutory
close corporation could effectively veto the transaction, instead of
being relegated to exercising the objecting stockholder's fair appraisal
remedy under the general corporation law. 6
Unanimity, in and of itself, is not objectionable. The potential
benefits of stockholder unanimity provisions, particularly in guarding
against the oppression of minority stockholders, cannot be denied.
At the time of incorporation, however, a careful analysis may indicate
that a combination of corporate plans for growth coupled with an
33. Professor O'Neal, although not taking a firm position against unanimity, does
emphasize the danger of unanimity and high voting requirements as follows:
First, a shareholder with a veto may use his veto power to extort unfair con-
cessions from his associates as a condition to giving his approval to desired
corporate action. Second, veto arrangements deprive a corporation of flexibility
which it may need to adjust to new situations. Third, high vote requirements
greatly increase the chance of deadlock and corporate paralysis and raise the diffi-
cult question of what arrangements can be set up to break deadlocks when
they develop.
O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 8.09, at 562 (footnotes omitted).
34. CODE § 4-601.
35. The concept of making unanimity selectively applicable to certain types of
major corporate transactions would apply equally to both the Title Four Corporation
and the privately-held corporation.
36. CODE § 3-202 (right of stockholders dissenting from certain specified extra-
ordinary corporate matters to receive the "fair value" of their shares). For an example
of an emerging alternative to the objecting stockholders' fair appraisal remedy under
the Federal Securities Laws, see Green v. Santa Fe Industries, Inc., Current CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 95,447 (2d Cir. 1976); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., Current
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 95,448 (2d Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held in these cases that minority stockholders were entitled to relief under rule
lOb-5 when majority stockholders utilized short-form mergers or similar devices solely
to squeeze the minority out of a corporation by forcing them to relinquish their
stockholdings for the "fair appraisal" price. This alternative, however, would be
applicable only to unfair "squeeze-outs" of minority stockholders.
1976]
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appreciation of the potential disadvantages of unanimity requirements
dictate the use of substantial, but less than unanimous, affimative
voting requirements to avoid the possibility that corporate growth
may be stunted due to the negativism of one disgruntled stockholder.
The general corporation law permits modification of voting require-
ments for individual corporate actions, including the option to select
unanimity." Such flexibility is not available under the blanket
unanimity requirement of Title Four. Hence, as will be discussed in
Part II, it may well be that flexibility in corporate planning is actually
more characteristic of a privately-held corporation than of a statutory
close corporation. The frustration of being locked into the unanimity
format is intensified when a stockholder is confronted with an unfore-
seen contingency requiring the elimination of unanimity, either
through amending the agreement or amending the charter to terminate
the close corporation election. The stockholder must contend with a
"Catch 22" situation: such a result can only be reached through a
unanimous agreement. 88
B. The Problems of Relaxing Corporate Formalities
Close corporation proponents are careful to emphasize that a
statute such as Maryland's Title Four "eliminates or relaxes certain
formalities and standard procedures which are unnecessary in the case
of the small corporation."3 9  Among other things, the traditional
managing board of directors, directors' meetings, and annual stock-
holders' meetings are not required of statutory close corporations. 0
The paucity of documentation set forth in close corporation minute
books 4' suggests that, in practice, this relaxation of requirements fre-
quently has been interpreted as eliminating the need to maintain
adequate records of corporate action.
37. The requirement that certain major corporate acts be approved by the
affirmative vote of two-thirds of all the votes entitled to be cast on the matter, CoDE
§ 3-105 (d), may be modified to require the concurrence of a greater proportion of the
votes or a lesser proportion of the votes (but this may not be less than a majority of
all the votes to be cast). Id. § 2-104(b) (4) & (5).
38. CODE § 4-203.
39. Hall, supra note 7, at 342.
40. CODE §§ 4-302, 4-402.
41. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. In making the random review
referred to in note 26 supra, the author discovered little or no documentation of cor-
porate action, other than organizational minutes.
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A lack of recorded corporate history may have serious conse-
quences, and prudence, if not the statute,42 dictates maintaining such
formal records, at least to provide reliable evidence of corporate action
which may subsequently be questioned. In a corporate enterprise
composed of two or more persons, some disputes are bound to arise
over, for example, such matters as the rate of compensation to be paid
to a stockholder-employee, a fringe benefit which he or she may claim,
or an agency authorization for a challenged corporate agreement.
Documentation is unlikely to fade as rapidly as memory, which may
be warped by such factors as personal differences, attitude changes,
or plain greed. Moreover, a corporate history, properly chronicled
through minutes, may assist later efforts to obtain debt financing from
a bank or to raise equity capital.
44
42. Although the Maryland statute is not perfectly clear, it appears that formal
minutes may be statutorily required even if there is an election to have no board of
directors pursuant to CODE § 4-302 because stockholders are nonetheless responsible
for those actions which the general corporation law requires of directors. Id. §
4-303(2). In particular, under the general corporation law, directors' minutes must
be recorded in writing and the books and records must be in at least a form which
can be converted into written form for visual inspection. Id. § 2-111(a) & (b).
Furthermore, the general law requires a corporation to keep, in addition to directors'
minutes, "minutes of the proceedings of its stockholders." Id. § 2-111 (a) (2).
Regardless of formal minutes, books, and records requirements under Title
Four, there are other reasons of importance for maintaining such records. One reason
is the potential tax consequences. Implicit in the Internal Revenue Code is the necessity
for extensive recordation of corporate action taken in compliance with tax require-
ments. For example, fringe benefit deduction claims by the corporation and correspond-
ing exemption from income claims by its stockholder-employees may be lost by the
lack of proper record-keeping. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1 (a) (1959) which provides:
[a]ny person subject to tax under subtitle A of the Code, or any person required
to file a return of information with respect to income [including corporations],
shall keep such permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as
are sufficient to establish the amount of gross income, deductions, credits, or
other matters required to be shown by such person in any return of such tax
or information.
See also id. § 1.6001-1 (e) which provides:
The books or records required by this section shall be kept at all times, available
for inspection by authorized internal revenue officers or employees, and shall be
retained so long as the contents thereof may become material in the administra-
tion of any internal revenue law.
These record-keeping requirements suggest the need to maintain minutes respecting
the adoption of fringe-benefits such as pension plans or other deductible benefits
accorded to employees through employment agreements duly adopted by the board
of directors.
43. See 9 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,
§ 4617, at 522 (rev. ed. 1964), where the author states that "[c]orporate books and
records, when properly authenticated, are the best evidence of the acts, resolutions
and proceedings of the corporation." (emphasis added).
44. As to the need for corporate records in connection with equity financing, see
R. SHAPIRO, A. SACHS & C. OLANDEn, SEcurTms REGULATION FoR s, COMPLIANCE-
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A frequent problem, not necessarily limited to statutory close
corporations, is the failure to set forth stock issuance resolutions in
the corporate minute book. The omission of such information not
only increases the risk of dispute as to the ownership percentages
accorded the various stockholders, but also leads to the loss of a
valuable option otherwise available to corporations that have author-
ized no-par stock. Unless prior to the stock issuance an allocation to
capital surplus is resolved by the directors or, in the case of a statutory
close corporation without directors, by the stockholders, 45 the corpo-
ration loses the right to create such surplus in connection with that
issuance.46 Indeed, the absence of such surplus could disable the
corporation from a repurchase of its stock47 or the declaration of a
dividend48 at a later date.
Many privately-held corporations probably do not follow the rule
of careful record-keeping and the maintenance of formalities. Never-
theless, the clear orientation of the statutory close corporation toward
informality makes it even more susceptible to sloppy corporate house-
keeping. One potentially critical consideration is that if the corporate
house is not in order at the time a challenge is leveled at the limitation
on liability of its stockholders the very failure to adhere to a modicum
of corporate formality may well be weighed in favor of piercing the
corporate veil.49 Since Title Four permits statutory close corporations
to omit certain formalities, it may be argued that the statutory close
corporation is less susceptible to challenges aimed at piercing the
corporate veil for failure to maintain formalities. The effectiveness
of such an argument is diminished, however, when it is recognized
that statutory close corporation stockholders are specifically charged
with taking such steps as would otherwise be required of corporate
directors in order to implement a corporate action.50 Hence, if a close
PRACTICE, § 1.04, at 1-4 & 1-5 (1975). As to such need in connection with debt
financing, see Letter from Leonard Richards of the Mercantile-Bank & Trust Com-
pany to the author, April 28, 1976.
Other reasons for maintaining proper records are mentioned briefly in note
42 supra.
45. CODE § 2-303 (b) (2).
46. See note 50 and accompanying text infra.
47. CODE§ 2-311(d).
48. Id. § 2-309(b) (2).
49. Taken alone this failure may not justify disregarding the limited liability of
the corporate entity, but it could be a factor in a court's consideration. See, e.g., Zubik
v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 988 (1968). "[Slhare-
holders as such are, according to the general rule, not liable for corporate torts, but
they might be where formalities are not substantially observed, initial financing was
not adequate, etc." H. HENN, Law of Corporations, § 146, at 254 (2d ed. 1970).
50. CODE § 4-303.
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corporation minute book does not set forth in stockholders' minutes
what should otherwise be set forth in a privately-held corporation's
directors' minutes, then a thread in the corporate veil may well have
been pulled.
C. The Dissolution Process
Dissolution has been given special treatment under Title Four.5
Any stockholder may seek dissolution when "there is such internal
dissension among the stockholders of the corporation that [its] busi-
ness and affairs . ..can no longer be conducted to the advantage of
the stockholders generally. '52 Furthermore, a single stockholder may,
in the absence of a provision to the contrary in the stockholders'
agreement, compel a dissolution if he does not receive the approval
required in that agreement for a transfer of his stock.53 The only
alternative to such approval or dissolution is for the other stockholders
to purchase the shares of the stockholder seeking dissolution. If these
stockholders are without the funds to acquire those shares, they may
well be compelled to permit the dissolution of their business.
Thus, while the dissolution provisions of Title Four have been
characterized as an "important safety valve" for stockholders involved
in a "close personal relationship," '54 they do not take into account
the fact that stockholders in statutory close corporations frequently
have limited resources and cannot afford to stave off dissolution
despite their desire, and statutory right, 55 to do so. Moreover, no
matter how "close" and "personal" business relationships may be, it
is doubtful that they warrant conferring on one stockholder the power
to confront the other stockholders with an ultimatum to buy back
his stock or suffer dissolution. It may be argued that the Title Four
standard for involuntary dissolution obviates frivolous dissolution
claims because it requires such a high degree of dissension that the
corporation's "business and affairs . . . can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of the stockholders generally."56 Nevertheless, one
stockholder, through his own devices, may generate enough negative
feeling among the other stockholders to compel a court finding that
dissolution is warranted unless the buy-back provision is exercised.
51. Id. §§ 4-602, 4-603.
52. Id. § 4-602(a).
53. Id. § 4-602(b) (i). Professor Hall suggests that dissolution may be an un-
satisfactory method of resolving this dilemma. See Hall, supra note 7, at 351.
54. Hall, supra note 7, at 361.
55. CoDE§ 4-603(a).
56. Id. §4-602(a).
1976]
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The point here, as in the areas requiring unanimity, is that the
majority of the stockholders in a statutory close corporation may be
subjected to the tyranny of a minority of one.
II. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW ALTERNATIVES TO ACCOMPLISH
PURPORTED ADVANTAGES OF CLOSE
CORPORATION STATUTE
Do the purported advantages of close corporation status, namely,
the planning options of ,the unanimous stockholders' agreement and
the informal modes for taking corporation actions, outweigh its po-
tential disadvantages? A negative answer to this question would seem
to be indicated in view of the fact that the same advantages are avail-
able to corporations formed under the general corporation law.
A. Ease of Corporate Planning for the General Practitioner
To proponents of the statutory close corporation, the clear au-
thorization of the unanimous stockholders' agreement is considered
"the most important contribution of [the special] statute . . . .
The section of the Maryland Act governing the contents of the unani-
mous stockholders' agreement provides :"
Under a unanimous stockholders' agreement, the stockholders
of a close corporation may regulate any aspect of the affairs of
the corporation or the relations of the stockholders, including:
(1) The management of the business and affairs of the corpo-
ration;
(2) Restrictions on the transfer of stock;
(3) The right of one or more stockholders to dissolve the corpo-
ration at will or on the occurrence of a specified event or con-
tingency;
(4) The exercise or division of voting power;
(5) The terms and conditions of employment of an officer or
employee of the corporation, without regard to the period of his
employment;
(6) The individuals who are to be directors and officers of the
corporation; and
(7) The payment of dividends or the division of profits.
With only minor qualifications, however, each of these matters may
also be regulated under the general corporation law through the
57. Hall, supra note 7, at 344.
58. CODE § 4-401 (a).
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articles of incorporation, the by-laws, and other corporate organiza-
tional documents. Taken together, these documents can embody
virtually all of the claimed advantages for ordering corporate affairs
that are attributed to the close corporation's stockholders' agreement.
Indeed, implementation in the general corporation law context may
actually prove to be less complicated than drafting a satisfactory
unanimous stockholders' agreement.
Despite the assertion that the unanimous stockholders' agree-
ment and the close corporation simplify corporate planning for "the
lawyer who is not a corporate expert" 59 the reverse may be true;
by setting forth a broad checklist of permissible provisions for inclu-
sion in the articles of incorporation," the general corporation law may
actually aid the unsophisticated practitioner in assessing and imple-
menting the range of planning options most suitable for achieving
clients' objectives. Section 2-104 of the general corporation law
provides :61
The articles of incorporation may include:
(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines,
limits, or regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors
and stockholders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders
of any bonds, notes, or other securities which it may issue;
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent with law on the transfer-
ability of stock of any class;
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included in
the by-laws;
(4) Any provision which requires for any purpose the concur-
rence of a greater proportion of the votes of all classes or of any
class of stock than the proportion required by this article for that
purpose;
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser propor-
tion of the votes of all classes or of any class of stock than the
proportion required by this article for that purpose, but this
proportion may not be less than a majority of all the votes entitled
to be cast on the matter;
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and
specifies the term of office of each class; and
(7) A provision of minority representation through cumulative
voting in the election of directors and the terms on which cumula-
tive voting rights may be exercised.
59. Hall, supra note 7, at 364.
60. CODE §§ 2-103 to 2-105.
61. Id. §2-104(b).
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Section 2-105 adds :1
A corporation may provide by its charter:
(1) For one or more classes of stock, the voting rights of each
class, and any restriction on or denial of these rights;
(2) As to each class of stock, either the par value of the shares
or that the shares are without par value;
(3) (i) That the corporation shall set apart dividends for or
pay dividends to the holders of a specified class of stock before
any dividends are set apart for or paid to the holders of another
class of stock;
(ii) The rate, amount, and time of payment of the divi-
dends; and
(iii) Whether the dividends are cumulative, cumulative to
a limited extent, or noncumulative;
(4) That any specified class of stock is preferred over another
class as to its distributive share of the assets on voluntary or in-
voluntary liquidation of the corporation and the amount of the
preference;
(5) That any specified class of stock may be redeemed at the
option of the corporation or of the holders of the stock and the
terms and conditions of redemption, including the time and price
of redemption;
(6) That any specified class of stock is convertible in-to shares
of stock of one or more other classes and the terms and condi-
tions of conversion;
(7) That the holders of any specified securities issued or to be
issued by the corporation have any voting or other rights which,
by law, are or may be conferred on stockholders;
(8) For any other preferences, rights, restrictions, including
restrictions on transferability, and qualifications not inconsistent
with law;
(9) That the board of directors may classify or reclassify any
unissued stock from time to time by setting or changing the
preferences, conversion or other rights, voting powers, restric-
tions, limitations as to dividends, qualifications, or terms or con-
ditions of redemption of the stock; and
(10) For any definition, limitation, or denial of the preemptive
rights of stockholders to acquire additional stock in the corpo-
ration.
62. Id. § 2-105.
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This list is supplemented by permissible provisions for inclusion
in the corporation's by-laws.6 3 In short, the guidelines expressly fur-
nished by the general corporation law are more exhaustive and explicit
than those set forth in the close corporation law. Hence it would
seem that, despite contentions to the contrary, the former may assist
the non-experienced practitioner far more than the latter.
But if Title Four does not facilitate corporate planning for "the
lawyer who is not a corporate expert,"64 does it offer any significant
substantive advantages to the privately-held corporation that are not
offered by the general corporation law? This question can only be
answered by a comparison of the planning possibilities available under
close and general corporate law.
B. Unanimity and Deadlock Possibilities
As has been demonstrated, the blanket unanimity provided by
Title Four can prove to be extremely dangerous in practice. Never-
theless, the protection of minority stockholders' interests against
oppression by the majority6 5 may warrant the selective use of
unanimity and high voting requirement provisions. The general
corporation law accords the corporate planner the option of imposing
unanimity in each of the areas for which it is required under Title
Four.66 Thus, where minority stockholders fear exclusion from the
corporate decision-making process on certain vital matters, the general
corporation law would permit the inclusion in the articles of incorpo-
ration of a provision specifically enumerating such matters and ex-
63. The general corporation law is engulfed in "unless otherwise provided"
provisions. See, e.g., CODE § 2-109(b) (subsequent by-laws to be adopted by the stock-
holders unless the charter or by-laws provide that the board of directors shall do so) ;
id. § 2-204(a) (corporation may not issue stock for convertible securities in violation
of a limitation or restriction contained in its charter or by-laws); id. § 2-204(c)
(charter or by-laws may require stockholder approval for the issuance of stock as a
stock dividend); id. § 2-213 (by-laws may alter or modify the power of the board of
directors to issue new stock certificates upon the loss, theft, or destruction of existing
certificates); id. § 2-401(b) (board of directors may exercise all powers of the
corporation except those reserved to the stockholders by law or by the charter or the
by-laws of the corporation); id. § 2-403 (qualifications of directors may be prescribed
by the charter or by-laws) ; id. § 2-404(b) (2) (term of office may be provided in the
by-laws subject to certain limitations contained in this statutory section).
64. Hall, supra note 7, at 364. This proposition should be considered in light of
note 89 and accompanying text infra.
65. For a discussion on certain cautions to be taken in using high vote require-
ments see O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 8.09, at 562.
66. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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pressly providing for unanimity in decisions thereon.67 Moreover, the
general corporation law, unlike Title Four, permits a designation,
within certain limits, of the vote required to approve each kind of
major corporate transaction. Thus, if the corporate needs warrant
the inclusion of such provisions, a different voting requirement -
ranging from a majority of the shares entitled to vote to unanimous
approval of the shares entitled to vote - may be incorporated for
each of the enumerated transactions.
68
The principals in a privately-held corporation might decide that
neither substantial nor unanimous affirmative stockholder voting
requirements would be appropriate. Rather, they might conclude that
the decisions of a majority stockholder should bind all of the stock-
holders. Nevertheless, opting for majority stockholder approval need
67. Such a provision might read:
The following provisions are hereby adopted for the purpose of defining, limiting,
and regulating the powers of the corporation and of the directors and stock-
holders thereof:
(1) With respect to:
(a) the amendment of the charter of the Corporation,
(b) the consolidation of the Corporation with one or more other corpora-
tions to form a new consolidated corporation,
(c) the merger of the Corporation into another corporation or the merger
of one or more other corporations into the Corporation,
(d) the sale, lease, exchange, or other transfer of all, or substantially all,
of the property and assets of the Corporation, including its goodwill
and franchises,
(e) the voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or winding up
of the Corporation,
(f) the issuance of shares of stock of any class now or hereafter au-
thorized, or of any securities exchangeable for, or convertible into
such shares, or of warrants or other instruments evidencing rights
or options to subscribe for, or otherwise acquire such shares, and
(g) the amendment of the By-Laws of the Corporation,
any such action shall be effective and valid only if taken by a unanimous vote of
all the shares of capital stock outstanding at the time of such action, after due
authorization, approval or advice of such action by the Board of Directors as
required by law, notwithstanding any provision of law requiring any action to
be taken or authorized by the stockholders other than as provided in this Article.
See CODE § 2-104(b) (4) (allowing the concurrence of a greater proportion of the
votes of all or any class of stock than the proportion set out in the Article).
Furthermore, the articles of incorporation may divide a corporation's directors
into classes under section 2-104(b) (6) or may contain "[a] provision for minority
representation through cumulative voting in the election of directors . . . ." under
section 2-104(b) (7). Being represented on the board of directors gives minority stock-
holders at least a chance to present their views. Also, by virtue of holding a seat on
the board, a minority stockholder may be accorded full inspection rights. See In re
Cohen v. Cocoline Products, Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955); accord, 5
FLETcHER, supra note 43, § 2235, at 872.
68. CODE § 2-104(b) (4) & (5). See also note 37 and accompanying text supra.
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not preclude protection of minority interests in some aspects of the
decision-making process. The general corporation law permits flexi-
bility in the use of classes of stock and classes of directors to give
minority as well as majority stockholders the power to elect mem-
bers of the board of directors and, through them, to participate
in, or at least to be kept abreast of, corporate management decisions.69
For example, by utilizing three classes of stock, each of which would
be identical in all respects except as to the election of directors,
minority stockholders could be given the right to elect a director
who would represent their class of stock, while the majority stock-
holders would hold a class of stock entitled to elect a clear majority
of directors.7" If minority stockholders make known at the planning
69. Id. § 2-104(b) (6). See note 67 supra. It should be noted that utilization of
different classes of stock could cause a corporation with ten or fewer stockholders to
lose the right to elect Subchapter S status under the Internal Revenue Code. See note
110 infra. Nevertheless, if it is desired that a privately-held corporation achieve both
minority stockholder representation on the board of directors and Subchapter S status,
such objective can be implemented through the inclusion of cumulative voting provisions
in the charter. Such provisions avoid the Subchapter S prohibition on classes of stock.
70. The following provision could be included in the Articles of Incorporation to
designate classes of directors to be elected by specified classes of stockholders:
The total number of shares of capital stock which the Corporation has
authority to issue is 30X divided into lOX shares of Class A Common Stock
without par value (the "Class A Common Stock"), 1OX shares of Class B
Common Stock without par value (the "Class B Common Stock") and 1OX shares
of Class C Common Stock without par value (the "Class C Common Stock").
The following is a description of each class of stock of the Corporation with the
preferences, conversion and other rights, restrictions, voting powers and qualifica-
tions of each class:
(1) With respect to the election of the Board of Directors of the Corporation:
(a) the holders of Class A Common Stock (i) shall nominate and elect
one (1) director who shall be known as the Class A Director, and
(ii) in the event of the death, disability, removal, resignation or
refusal to act of the Class A Director, the holders of Class A
Common Stock, to the exclusion of the holders of all other classes of
stock of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect a director to fill
the vacancy so created by such death, disability, removal, resignation
or refusal to act;
(b) the holders of Class B Common Stock (i) shall nominate and elect
one (1) director who shall be known as the Class B Director, and
(ii) in the event of the death, disability, removal, resignation or
refusal to act of the Class B Director, the holders of Class B Com-
mon Stock, to the exclusion of the holders of all other classes of
stock of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect a director to fill
the vacancy so created by such death, disability, removal, resignation
or refusal to act; and
(c) the holders of Class C Common Stock (i) shall nominate and elect
three (3) directors who shall be known as the Class C Directors,
and (ii) in the event of the death, disability, removal, resignation or
refusal to act of any or all or the Class C Directors, the holders of
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stage their desire to have rights beyond such management selection,
a combination of classes of stock and adjustments for high voting
requirements on selected matters could be utilized to accord them even
more protection.
Another potential fear of minority stockholders is that director
or stockholder meetings may be held, and corporate transactions
undertaken, in their absence. By not participating in such meetings
they may be deprived of the flow of important corporate information.
Notice of meetings may do little to solve this problem as the meetings
may nonetheless be held at times or places inconvenient to minority
stockholders. The general corporation law resolves this dilemma by
permitting the implementation of high or unanimous quorum require-
ments in the by-laws to protect minority interests from oppression71
based upon exclusion of the minority from meetings.
At times, the corporate planner may be charged with protecting
the interests of the majority rather than of the minority.72 For in-
stance, all participants in a privately-held corporation may agree that
in order to implement corporate objectives the minority stockholders
are to have no more than a financial interest in the corporation. In
Class C Common Stock, to the exclusion of the holders of all other
classes of stock of the Corporation, shall nominate and elect one or
more directors to fill the vacancy or vacancies so created by such
death, disability, removal, resignation or refusal to act.
(2) Except as hereinabove provided in paragraph (1) of this Article, the
Class A Common Stock, the Class B Common Stock and the Class C
Common Stock of the Corporation shall be identical in all respects and
for all purposes and the holders of Class A Common Stock, the holders of
Class B Common Stock and the holders of Class C Common Stock voting
together and without distinction as to class shall be entitled to one vote
per share in all proceedings in which actions shall be taken by the
stockholders of the Corporation.
The number of directors of the Corporation shall be five (5). The names of
the directors who shall act until the first annual meeting of the stockholders of the
Corporation and until their successors are duly chosen and qualified and the class
of Common Stock which they represent are:
CLASS A DIRECTOR CLASS B DnRCTOR CLASS C DIRECTORS
V W X
y
Z
71. CODE § 2-408(b) (1), which provides: "Unless the by-laws of the corporation
provide otherwise, a majority of the entire board of directors constitutes a quorum for
the transaction of business." (emphasis added). An appropriate protective by-law
provision such as that relating to a unanimous quorum, may be insulated from amend-
ment by high or unanimous voting requirements for amendments. See notes 89-90
and accompanying text infra.
72. Frequently a lawyer representing a corporation inadvertently may attempt to
act for all potential stockholders, although they may have divergent interests by virtue,
for example, of their majority and minority status.
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this situation, the objective of corporate planning would be to allo-
cate all voting rights to majority stockholders. Under the general
corporation law, a combination of voting and non-voting stock can
be used to limit the minority's rights to any non-financial incidents
of stock ownership. 73  This objective, however, cannot be achieved
under the close corporation statute, for although Title Four allows
the designation of non-voting stock, such designation cannot operate
to preclude the holders of any stock from voting on those matters
which require unanimous stockholder approval.74 As these examples
show, the pattern of rights and protections built into the close corpo-
ration statute is fixed to a significant extent, while the potential for
variation in allocating rights to majority and minority interests is
virtually limitless under the general corporation law.
C. Limitations Upon the Transfer of Stock
Title Four imposes certain statutory restrictions on stock trans-
fers75 and allows the stockholders' agreement to include further
restrictions. 76 The Maryland general corporation law permits articles
of incorporation to embody any or all of the restrictions required
and permitted under Title Four.77 Similarly, the traditional privately-
held corporation "buy-sell" or "restrictive transfer" agreement may
contain such restrictions on stock transfer.78  "Reasonable" stock
73. CODE § 2-105(1) & (3). As to the denial of Subchapter S status by virtue
of the use of classes of stock, see note 69 supra.
74. Id. § 4-504(a) which states in pertinent part: "Notwithstanding any denial
or restriction, all stock has voting rights on any matter required by this title to be
authorized by the affirmative vote of every stockholder or every subscriber for stock
of a close corporation."
75. Id. § 4-501.
76. Id. § 4-401(a) (2).
77. Id. § 2-104(b) (2).
78. A "buy-sell" or "restrictive stock transfer" agreement generally imposes re-
strictions on the sale of stockholdings by stockholders in a privately-held corporation.
These restrictions, usually requiring that a withdrawing or deceased stockholder's
estate sell stock back to the corporation or the remaining stockholders, are directed
at preventing unwanted persons from participating in a closely held business entity. In
contrast to broadly drawn stockholder agreements covering a wide range of cor-
porate matters including control, these agreements have not been voided because they
do not affect the corporate decision making processes. Nevertheless, restrictive stock
transfer and buy-sell agreements must be drafted with an eye toward the common law
principle that "unreasonable restrictions upon alienation are unenforceable." Ghinger,
Shareholders Agreements for Closely Held Corporations: Special Tools for Special
Circumstances, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 211, 215 (1975). 1 F. HODGE O'NEA., CLosE CoR-
PORATIONs § 5.29, at 101 (1971) indicates that "[t]ransferees with knowledge of a
shareholders' agreement probably will be held to be bound by it." As a protection to
later enforceability the CODE § 2-211 (d) requires that share certificates subject to share-
holders' agreements be appropriately legended so as to give proper and actual notice.
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transfer restrictions have long been recognized as valid apart from and
without regard to the provisions of Title Four.7
Because of their simplicity and automatic applicability the Title
Four statutory stock transfer restrictions are susceptible to being
construed as comprehensive in their coverage; that is, they might
be unquestioningly considered to provide all the protection possible
from stock transfer restrictions unless scrutinized by an experienced
eye. By contrast, however, the absence of such provisions under the
general corporation law should serve to induce the corporate planner
and clients to assess their needs more realistically. They may well
consider a much wider range of possibilities than those envisioned by
Title Four, and may ultimately provide for stock transfer restrictions
and buy-sell provisions that afford much more protection to all partici-
pants."0 It would seem that adhering to set statutory restrictions
rather than conforming to individual circumstances simply to reduce
lawyer burdens is inimical to professional responsibility.8 '
There is another significant advantage to setting forth stock
transfer restrictions in general corporation buy-sell agreements or
in the articles of incorporation. The stockholders are accorded flexi-
bility as to the basis upon which a change in such restrictions may
be effectuated at a later date. While a Title Four unanimous stock-
holders' agreement may not be amended unless all the parties to the
agreement approve, 2 a general corporation law buy-sell agreement or
charter provision can allow for later amendment by less than unani-
mous approval.8 3 Such terms for amendment ensure that provisions
which ultimately may emerge as unworkable or unrealistic or which
may warrant periodic revision, including, in particular, provisions
79. O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 6.04, at 378; 2 O'NEA.L, supra note 78, § 7.07, at 18.
See generally 12 FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 5461.1, at 192.
80. Professor Hall himself suggests the advisability of utilizing the "stock pur-
chase" agreement in lieu of relying upon Title Four stock transfer restrictions. Hall,
at 351. Although allowing one stockholder the power to force a buy-back-my-stock-
or-dissolve-the-corporation situation is not herein advocated, see notes 34-36 and
accompanying text supra, it should be noted for the advocates of such a position that
the buy-sell agreement may be utilized to accomplish the same result as the buy-back
provisions of Title Four.
81. Cf. ABA CODE OF PRoFESsIoNAL REsPossmIrry, DR-6-101(A)(1) (1970).
("A lawyer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.")
82. CODE § 4-401(b).
83. Shareholders' agreements may provide for whatever voting requirements
respecting amendment the parties wish. See generally O'NEA, supra note 78, § 5.19,
at 72-76.
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relating to valuation of shares, may be altered on the approval of some
pre-designated number of stockholders.
D. Other Matters and the Unanimous Stockholders' Agreement
Title Four permits the unanimous stockholders' agreement to
regulate "[t] he management of the business and affairs of the corpo-
ration.""M This provision follows logically from the elimination of
the board of directors by permitting corporate management to be
vested in the stockholders.8 5 It must be remembered, however, that
if the stockholders' agreement permits the stockholders to assume
corporate management duties, they are then required by Title Four to
act on any matters upon which a board of directors would otherwise
be required to act.
8 6
In a privately-held corporation, the stockholders are frequently
directors and are therefore vested with the authority to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation by virtue of their dual posi-
tions. Further, the general corporation law permits the allocation
of specific management responsibilities to individuals within the corpo-
rate framework. By-law provisions may delegate to specific stock-
holder-officers the authority to enter certain types of designated
transactions, and may allocate authority over particular functions or
areas of management responsibility among the individual corporate
officers.8 ' For example, in a manufacturing company, design might
be delegated to the president, marketing and production to the vice-
president, and finance to the secretary-treasurer, all of whom are
stockholders who desire to agree upon management functions in
advance.88 In order to assure that the authority and responsibility
allocated to specific officers in the privately-held corporation are not
later rescinded by the board of directors, 9 the charter or by-laws
could provide that their amendment or the amendment of these
particular authorization provisions may only be effectuated by the
unanimous vote of the board of directors or the stockholders."
84. CODE § 4-401 (a) (1). Although not entirely logical, it is possible under Title
Four to maintain a board of directors and yet delegate management to the shareholders.
85. Id. § 4-303 (1).
86. Id. § 4-303 (2).
87. Id. § 2-414(a).
88. See generally D. HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 40-44 (1966).
89. CODE § 2-414(a) (2).
90. Id. § 2-414(a). See also HERwiTz, supra note 88, at 39-40, where the
author states:
A possible solution to this problem is suggested by the fact that a party who
has control of at least one-half of the board of directors would seem to be entirely
safe ... since he can prevent any affirmative action terminating his employment.
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Moreover, as has been discussed, 91 a privately-held corporation
may utilize classes of stock coupled with classes of directors 92 or classes
of voting and non-voting stock93 to divide and subdivide specific
management responsibilities. If it were desired that certain stock-
holders have all management responsibilities, this could be achieved
under the general corporation law by issuing all of the corporation's
voting stock to those stockholders, thereby providing them with sole
management authority. Such a provision could accomplish the same
objective as a Title Four stockholder agreement provision delegating
management responsibilities to specific stockholders, while at the same
time providing for "[t]he exercise or division of voting power" and
designating "[t]he individuals who are to be directors and officers
of the corporation.19 4
The general corporation law explicitly authorizes a specific type
of management allocation agreement - the voting trust agreement. 95
Every employee who is also a director can obtain the same veto power over
changes in his position or salary under a provision requiring a unanimous vote
of the board of directors for any action affecting his employment arrangement.
Provisions requiring a higher than majority vote for action by the board of
directors of a closely held corporation have been receiving increasingly sympa-
thetic treatment from the courts. Compare Katcher v. Ohsman, 26 N.J. Super. 28,
97 A.2d 180 (1953), with Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d
829 (1945). In addition, many modern corporation statutes appear to expressly
contemplate either a certificate of incorporation or by-law provisions requiring
a higher than majority vote by the directors, [as does Maryland under § 2-414].
At the board of director level, as at the shareholder level, the practical effect
of veto power may be achieved by setting a high quorum requirement for action
by the directors [citation omitted]. A provision requiring the presence of all of
the directors for a quorum would in effect give every director veto power, since
each could block any action by the board simply by staying away from the meeting.
91. Notes 69-70 & 72-73 and accompanying texts supra.
92. CODE § 2-104(b) (6).
93. Id. § 2-105(1). As to the denial of Subchapter S status because of the use
of classes of stock, see note 110 infra. It is particularly important to note that the use
of these control-classes of stock devices do not disadvantage the privately-held cor-
poration any more than the Title Four corporation by virtue of the non-availability of
Subchapter S. See note 110 infra.
94. CODE § 4-401(a) (4) & (6).
95. Id. § 2-510 which provides:
One or more stockholders of a corporation may confer the right to vote or other-
wise represent their stock to a trustee for a period not exceeding ten years by:
(1) Entering into a written voting trust agreement which specifies the terms
and conditions of the voting trust;
(2) Depositing an executed copy of the agreement with the corporation at
its principal office; and
(3) Transferring their stock for purposes of the agreement to a trustee.
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If desired, a voting trust may vest in one stockholder, subject to
traditional fiduciary duties, 6 all the voting power of the corporation.
By specifically authorizing the allocation of rights to voting trustees
through voting trust agreements, the general corporation law gives
the stockholders of a privately-held corporation another correlate to
Title Four management regulation and control.9 7 The specific statu-
96. Brown v. McLanahan, 148 F.2d 703, 706 (4th Cir. 1945), ("[i]t is elementary
that a trustee may not exercise powers granted in a way that is detrimental to the
cestuis que trustent"). See also S FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 2091.1, at 436, where he
states that "[v]oting trustees should be held to adhere to the usual fiduciary principles
of a trust." The same fiduciary duties should also apply to shareholders vested with
management under Title Four.
97. As an example of the thoroughness which voting trusts may embody, the
following clause may be included in the voting trust agreement:
Limitation Upon Voting Rights of Voting Trustee.
(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary provided for herein, in the
event that the Board of Directors of the Corporation shall have duly authorized
or approved or advised as required by law, the:
(i) amendment of the Charter of the Corporation;
(ii) consolidation of the Corporation with one or more other corpora-
tions (other than wholly owned subsidiaries of the Corporation) to form a
new consolidated corporation;
(iii) merger of the Corporation into another corporation (other than
wholly owned subsidiaries of the Corporation) or the merger of one or more
other corporations (other than wholly owned subsidiaries of the Corporation)
into the Corporation;
(iv) sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of all, or substantially all, of the
property and assets of the Corporation, including its goodwill and franchises;
(v) voluntary or involuntary liquidation, dissolution, or winding-up of
the Corporation;
(vi) issuance of shares of stock of any class now or hereafter authorized,
or any securities exchangeable for, or convertible into such shares, or warrants
or other instruments evidencing rights or options to subscribe for, or other-
wise acquire such shares;
(vii) redemption by the Corporation of shares of its own stock or the
purchase or other acquisition by the Corporation of its own shares;
(viii) a purchase by the Corporation, other than in the ordinary course
of business, of property and assets at a cost equivalent to or greater than Y
percent of the net worth of the Corporation as reflected on the balance sheet,
prepared by the Corporation's regularly employed accountants, most recent to
the date of such purchase;
(ix) investment by the Corporation, through the acquisition of shares of
,capital stock, partnership interest or otherwise, in other business entities,
except with respect to the establishment by the Corporation of wholly-owned
subsidiaries and investment in affiliated entities which engage primarily in
[business of corporation], and the investment by the Corporation in certifi-
,cates of deposit or other obligations of banking, savings and loan, and other
similar lending institutions whose accounts are insured by an instrumentality
of the government of the United States and in obligations of the government
of the United States, and in prime finance paper of corporations rated Al by
Moody's Investors Service, Inc. and rated P1 by Standard and Poor's Corp.;(x) amendment of any employment agreement, or the alteration of the
terms set forth therein, as shall be entered into between the Corporation and
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tory authorization of the voting trust agreement should dispel any
doubt concerning the vesting of corporate control in one stockholder
for a period of as long as ten years.9
The unanimous stockholders' agreement may also specify the
"terms and conditions of employment of an officer or employee of the
corporation, without regard to the length of the period of his employ-
ment."99 While, unquestionably, any corporation has the power to
hire employees and appoint officers, 00 the validity of long-term
employment contracts for officers has been challenged, generally on
the ground that "they bind the hands of future boards of directors."' 1
[Name of Voting Trustee] except with respect to any insurance, pension or
other fringe benefit programs maintained for the benefit of executive personnel;
(xi) making of any loans or advances by the Corporation other than to
employees and suppliers in the ordinary course of business; or
(xii) amendment of the By-Laws of the Corporation if such amendment
adversely affects the contract rights of any stockholders of the Corporation;
then, the Voting Trustee shall promptly call a meeting of all holders of voting
trust certificates and shall, not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the date of
such meeting, give written notice of such meeting to all holders of voting trust
certificates which notice shall include a brief summary of tht action to be taken
at such meeting, and the following provisions shall apply with respect thereto:
the Voting Trustee shall deliver to each respective holder of a voting trust cer-
tificate or to his attorney-in-fact (who shall exhibit to the Voting Trustee a
duly executed power of attorney with respect thereto) in attendance at such
meeting a proxy (entitling such voting trust certificate holder to vote as
hereinafter provided) of the Voting Trustee for the specific purpose of per-
mitting such voting trust certificate holder to vote upon the matter designated
in the written notice hereinabove referred to, and at said meeting each re-
spective holder of a voting trust certificate who shall have so received a proxy
shall be entitled to cast that number of votes equal to the number of shares
that the Voting Trustee shall hold pursuant to this voting trust agreement for
such respective holder of a voting trust certificate. The Voting Trustee shall
be entitled to cast all votes, in accordance with his best judgment, represented
by shares with respect to which he has not been required to deliver a proxy
pursuant hereto.
Items (i) to (xii) are intended to serve as model provisions only; the ultimate
protective provisions adopted in any voting trust would depend upon the individual
circumstances of the prospective voting trust certificate holders.
98. CODE § 2-510. Presumably ten years, the statutory time for voting trusts,
could provide protection sufficiently long to accomplish medium range control objec-
tives. If a longer period is desired then an alternative control device, such as a proxy
coupled with an interest, must be utilized. For a discussion of the so-called irrevocable
"proxy coupled with an interest," see O'NEA3, supra note 78, §§ 5-36, at 124-27.
99. Id. § 4-401(a) (5).
100. Id. § 2-413(a) states that "[u]nless the bylaws provide otherwise, the board
of directors shall elect the officers" (emphasis added).
101. 2 FLETCHER, supra note 43, § 336 ("Contracts of employment for life or in-
definite periods of officers and other key personnel are generally invalid because they
bind the hands of future boards of directors"). For a general discussion of the con-
trary views supporting long term officer employment contracts, see HERWITZ, supra
note 88, at 40, and note 102 infra.
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The Maryland general corporation statute, however, would appear to
validate long-term appointment or election of officers if approved by
the board of directors.1 " Thus, Title Four's authorization of long-
term officer employment contracts without regard to the length of
the term of the board of directors does not accomplish anything that
cannot be implemented under the general corporation law.
While the general corporation law specifically empowers the
board of directors to remove an officer, such removal cannot operate
to prejudice his or her contract rights for damages.'03 It may be
argued that the unanimous stockholders' agreement can authorize a
more permanent employment agreement, but whether the agreement
can guarantee employment and non-removal is questionable. 04  Such
permanent employment seems contrary to the long-standing public
policy against specific enforcement of employment agreements.10 5
Hence, an employee of a close corporation, like an employee of any
other corporation, probably can resort only to a damage remedy, and
not to specific performance, under Title Four. Even if a forced
employment relationship were possible, it could lead to such "internal
dissension" as to trigger the Title Four dissolution provisions. 0
"The payment of dividends or division of profits" may be regu-
lated by the statutory close corporation stockholders' agreement. 0 7
Such a permissible use of the stockholders' agreement may be viewed
as circumventing the traditional general corporation law pre-requisite
that the declaration of dividends is a matter within the discretion of
the board of directors of the corporation.0 s However, this power of
102. CODE § 2-413(b). Herwitz is in accord, stating:
"[it is now clear that the board of directors has the power to execute an em-
ployment contract extending beyond its own term; and in the close corporation
area it is likely that the duration of an employment contract, even one for the
life of the employee, would not be a ground for invalidating it."
HERWITZ, supra note 88, at 39.
Although long-term employment contracts are valid it is clear that such
contracts cannot operate to deny a subsequent board of directors its absolute statutory
right to remove officers. CODE § 2-413(c). However, high or unanimous voting
requirements could be imposed to provide protection against termination similar to
that which may be provided by the unanimous stockholders' agreement. Imposition
of such a high vote requirement would make the likelihood of removal remote.
103. CODE § 2-413(c) (2).
104. See HENN, supra note 49, § 289, at 572.
105. See id. § 221, at 434-36 nn.1-9 & § 278, at 547.
106. CODE §§ 4-602, 4-603. Dissolution is discussed at notes 51-56 and accom-
panying text supra.
107. Id. § 4-401(a) (7).
108. HENN, supra note 49, § 327, at 665. See CoDE § 2-309(a).
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the board may be modified and dividend and profit allocation may be
regulated by the including in the articles of incorporation of a pri-
vately-held corporation stockholder agreements respecting dividend
preferences.' 09 Furthermore, provisions may be included for setting
apart dividends for, or paying dividends to, the holders of specified
classes of stock before any dividends are set apart for or paid to
holders of other classes of stock. 110 Articles of incorporation filed
under the general law may even expressly dilute directors' discretion
with respect to dividends to the extent of specifying the "rate, amount,
and time of payment of the dividends.""' Hence, it would seem that
the degree of latitude which the general corporation law accords the
privately-held corporation for regulating the division of profits and
the payment of dividends is at least co-extensive with that which may
be accorded to a statutory close corporation through the unanimous
stockholders' agreement. n2
109. CODE § 2-105 (3) (iii).
110. Id. § 2-105. This section provides:
A Corporation may provide by its charter:
(3) (i) That the corporation shall set apart dividends for or pay dividends to
the holders of a specified class of stock before any dividends are set apart for or
paid to the holders of another class of stock;
(ii) The rate, amount, and time of payment of the dividends; and
(iii) Whether the dividends are cumulative, cumulative to a limited ex-
tent, or noncumulative.
The utilization of separate classes of stock may have the effect of denying to-
the corporation the right to elect Subchapter S status. See INT. REV. CODE o 1954,
§ 1371 (a) (4). But see Rev. Rule 73-611, 1973-2 C.B. 312 (suggests that designation
of classes of voting and nonvoting stock by stockholders' agreement rather than by
charter does not effect right to elect Subchapter S status). This loss, however, should
not disadvantage the privately-held corporation vis-a-vis the Title Four corporation
since the Internal Revenue Service should treat special Title Four corporation pro-
visions respecting differences in payment of dividends and profits under the unanimous.
stockholders agreements as creating separate classes of stock, thereby defeating the
right to elect Subchapter S status. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1371-1(g) (1968) which
provides in pertinent part: "If the outstanding shares of stock of the corporation are-
not identical with respect to the rights and interest which they convey in the control,.
profits, and assets of the corporation, then the corporation is considered to have more
than one class of stock. Thus a difference as to voting rights, dividend rights, or
liquidation preferences of outstanding stock will disqualify a corporation" from being
a "small business" eligible to elect Subchapter S status (emphasis added).
111. CODE § 2-105 (3) (ii), quoted in full at note 110 supra.
112. It is significant to note that section 2-309(a) of the general corporation law
provides that the declaration of a dividend by the board of directors may be made only
if it is not "contrary to a restriction contained in its charter." Id. § 2-309(a). A fair
inference from this provision is that imposing limitations upon the declaration of
dividends, for example, by a unanimous director voting requirement, may also be ac-
complished through the charter of a privately-held corporation. It should also be noted
that employment agreement incentive compensation provisions may be utilized to,
divide profits.
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The foregoing demonstrates that substantially all of the matters
that may be regulated by the unanimous stockholders' agreement of a
statutory close corporation may be implemented equally effectively
in the articles of incorporation, by-laws, and restrictive transfer or
buy-sell agreements of a privately-held corporation. Moreover, the
implementation of such provisions in the traditional general corpora-
tion documents would seem to be less burdensome for the corporate
planner than utilizing the unanimous stockholders' agreement. Some
counsel might nevertheless find the unanimous stockholders' agree-
ment a useful device and its validity should therefore be upheld even
outside the Title Four context. Unfortunately, the validity of such
agreements prior to the enactment of Title Four was never reassur-
ingly clear, and it is for this reason that their express validation by
that statute was greeted with such acclaim."1 On balance, however,
it seems likely that the courts will - and should - sustain the
validity of such agreements in the context of privately-held corpora-
tions as well.
In particular, prior to the enactment of Title Four, the Maryland
Court of Appeals, in DeBoy v. Harris,"4 sustained the validity of an
agreement by three individuals respecting their contemplated organi-
zation and operation of a corporation. Among other things the
agreement designated -the recipients of the stock to be issued and
their percentages of stockholdings, fixed the corporation's capital
structure, and specified profit sharing and officer salaries. The three
stockholders apparently carried on their corporate affairs in compli-
ance with the agreement for just over four years, at which point one
stockholder brought suit for breach of the agreement by the other two.
The aggrieved stockholder grounded his action on his ouster as an
officer and director, a change in the corporation's capital structure,
the issuance of additional stock, and the consequent reduction of his
percentage of profits. The court recognized the issue of enforceability
of the stockholders' agreement as one of first impression in Maryland.
Citing a line of authorities from other jurisdictions favoring the
enforceability of such agreements "if rights of third parties have not
intervened,"" 5 the court analogized the agreement to one among
joint venturers and held that it survived the incorporation of the
business and was therefore valid.
113. Hall, supra note 7, at 344.
114. 207 Md. 212, 113 A.2d 903 (1955).
115. Id. at 219, 113 A.2d at 907.
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The implications of the DeBoy holding for stockholders' agree-
ments in privately-held corporations is not diminished by the unani-
mous stockholder agreement provisions of Title Four. The Maryland
legislature has mandated that nothing in those provisions shall "affect
any otherwise valid agreement among stockholders of a close corporat-
tion or of any other corporation.""16 It would seem, therefore, that
agreements patterned on the covenants sustained in DeBoy establish a
minimum level of privately-held stockholder agreement validity. Fur-
thermore, the broad statutory provisions for allowing corporate control
under the Maryland general corporation law" 7 indicate a legislative
sanction for parties to agree on certain control provisions upon incor-
poration. Whether such agreement is embodied in the traditional cor-
porate document, as advocated in this article,1 8 or in a contract between
the initial shareholders, the choice of form should have little effect on the
legality of the agreement. The factor controlling validity should be
whether the provisions lie within the boundaries of permissible allo-
cation of control in any corporate context." 9
The most obvious of these boundaries is the long-standing prohi-
bition against invasion of the discretionary powers of the board of
directors through stockholder agreements. Certain courts have re-
peatedly invalidated stockholders' agreements that attempt to dictate
to the board management decisions traditionally within its discretion. 2 '
It is clear that a stockholders' agreement in a privately-held corpora-
tion would not be enforced if it completely preempted the discretion
of the board of directors. 2 ' Short of total preemption of the board's
management function, however, it appears that the stockholders of a
privately-held corporation in Maryland have broad latitude to guide
management decisions. The two main areas of management tradi-
tionally left to the discretion of the board are the selection and tenure
of corporate officers, and the declaration of dividends. In DeBoy the
Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a shareholders'
agreement which designated certain individuals as corporate officers
116. CODE § 4-401(e). See Hall, supra note 7, at 344 n.14.
117. See CODE §§ 2-104, 2-105.
118. Text following note 112 supra.
119. Stockholder agreements have been invalidated in some jurisdictions because
they violated statutory norms for corporate management. See generally O'NEA,
supra note 78, § 5.06, at 18-27 and cases cited therein. Obviously, the broader the
statutory norms are the greater the permissible scope of stockholder agreements will
be. The breadth of the Maryland law is suggested at note 117 and accompanying text
supra and in the text following this note.
120. See generally O'NEAL, supra note 78, § 5.16, at 53-62 and cases cited therein.
121. Id.
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and provided for their tenure for an indefinite, but potentially lengthy
period. 122 Although the validity of a shareholders' agreement specify-
ing dividend declarations has not yet been tested in Maryland, the
Supreme Court of Illinois, in Galler v. Galler123 upheld such an
agreement in the context of a privately-held corporation, based on
reasoning similar to that in DeBoy. Like the DeBoy court, the
Illinois court noted that in the absence of fraud or injury to the
public or to creditors, and absent violations of specific statutory pro-
visions, there is no reason for denying enforcement of a stockholders'
agreement.1 2
4
Significantly, in Galler, the court reached its decision where the
stockholders' agreement was not even unanimous. One stockholder,
although voicing no opposition, was not an actual party to it. Hence,
where an agreement is unanimous among the stockholders of a
privately-held corporation, the reasons expressed in Galler for uphold-
ing it are even more valid, on estoppel-like grounds. 25 Moreover,
in a privately-held corporation, the stockholders are usually both the
directors and the officers, an interrelationship that, in fact, precludes
preemption of management discretion from the board of directors
since the individual parties to the agreement retain management
powers as members of the board. The recognition accorded this dual
role of stockholder and corporate manager by Title Four should be
extended to a privately-held corporation characterized by an identity
of interests between stockholders and directors. The reasons which
justify the statutory sanctioning of an unanimous stockholders' agree-
ment for the Title Four corporation are equally applicable, absent a
clear holding to the contrary in Maryland, to the validation of such
an agreement under the general corporation law.
Hence, participants in a privately-held corporation could solidify
their understandings through a stockholders' agreement similar to the
Title Four unanimous stockholders' agreement. Despite the existence
of such an option under the general corporation law, however, utiliza-
tion of the traditional corporate documentation would seem a prefera-
ble method for implementing agreements among participants in a
privately-held enterprise.
122. See 207 Md. at 214-15, 113 A.2d at 905.
123. 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964).
124. Id. at 24-26, 203 N.E.2d at 582-83. See also Pohn v. Diversified Indus., Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
125. See Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936).
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E. Liberal Inspection Rights
Title Four expands stockholder inspection rights beyond those
prescribed by the general provisions. 126 Nevertheless, if a privately-
held corporation is structured so that all stockholders are directors,127
then such stockholders'in their capacity as directors, will have the
broadest possible rights to inspect corporate records. 28 Furthermore,
if a non-director stockholder owns at least five percent of the corpora-
tion's outstanding stock, he will have a right of inspection almost as
extensive as that of a stockholder of a statutory close corporation.2
9
F. The Reduction of Formalities
Selection of Title Four status is advocated in part because of its
much vaunted simplification and reduction of formalities.' 0 It would
be misleading to infer, however, that the general corporation law
requires strict, burdensome, and unnecessary formalities. Such an
assumption lacks foundation; the general corporation law permits a
wide range of choices for satisfying formal requirements, most of
which represent neither surplusage nor difficulty for the privately-held
corporation.
The general corporation law provides that all corporations must
hold annual stockholder meetings.'1' Under Title Four annual meet-
ings need only be held if requested by a stockholder. 8 2  Yet general
126. CODE § 4-403 which provides:
A stockholder of a close corporation or his agent may inspect and copy during
usual business hours any records or documents of the corporation relevant to
its business and affairs, including any:
(1) By-laws;
(2) Minutes of the proceedings of the stockholders and directors;
(3) Annual statement of affairs;
(4) Stock ledger; and
(5) Books of accounts.
See also Hall, supra note 7, at 360.
127. CODE § 2-104.
128. Although there is no specific statutory provision affording directors inspection
without qualification, the right is well established. See, e.g., In re Cohen v. Cocoline
Products, Inc., 309 N.Y. 119, 127 N.E.2d 906 (1955) ; accord, 5 FLETCHER, supra note
43, § 2235, at 872 (perhaps the only qualifications would be improper motive or pre-
vention of abuse).
This right is inherent in directors' fiduciary duties and the liability attached
to directors for breach of these responsibilities. See also note 67 and accompanying
text supra.
129. Compare CODE § 2-513(a) with id. § 4-403.
130. Hall, supra note 7, at 363.
131. CODE § 2-501 (a).
132. Id. § 4-402(a).
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corporation law annual meeting requirements are only directory:
"The failure [of a privately-held corporation] to hold an annual
meeting does not invalidate the corporation's existence or affect any
otherwise valid corporate act.' '13 3 Hence even a privately-held corpo-
ration need not hold annual meetings unless requested to do so by a
stockholder on the threat of litigation or by judicial decree.
If counsel deems it prudent, and he or she should, for the stock-
holders to consider and record the types of matters designated for
annual action,'3 such stockholders' action may be taken informally
under the general corporation law. Directors may be elected and
other stockholder actions implemented through unanimous written
consent in lieu of an actual stockholder meeting.'3 5 In the event that
there is such dissension within the corporation that these basic matters
cannot be implemented informally, then a face-to-face meeting of stock-
holders would seem to be a necessary step towards the resolution of
differences.1 38
The general corporation law also permits directors to act infor-
mally. Any action which would be appropriate at a board meeting
may be accomplished without a meeting by unanimous written con-
sent of the directors. 1. 7 Moreover, directors may conduct meetings,
without being subject to unanimity requirements, by conference tele-
phone or similar equipment, provided that all directors can hear each
other at the same time.13 8 Hence, director action is not subject to the
133. Id. §2-501(d).
134. Id. § 2-501 (a), which provides: "Each corporation shall hold an annual meet-
ing of its stockholders to elect directors and transact any other business within its
powers." See also id. § 2-501(c).
135. Id. § 2-505 which provides:
Any action required or permitted to be taken at a meeting of stockholders may
be taken without a meeting if the following are filed with the records of stock-
holders' meetings:(1) A unanimous written consent which sets forth the action and is
signed by each stockholder entitled to vote on the matter; and
(2) A written waiver of any right to dissent signed by each stockholder
entitled to notice of the meeting but not entitled to vote at it.
136. This would apply equally to Title Four corporations wracked by dissension
and a stockholder could require that such a meeting be held. CODE § 4-402 (a).
137. Id. § 2-408(c), which provides:
Any action required or permitted to be taken at a meeting of the board of
directors or of a committee of the board may be taken without a meeting, if a
unanimous written consent which sets forth the action is:
(1) Signed by each member of the board or committee; and
(2) Filed with the minutes of proceedings of the board or committee.
138. Id. § 2-409(d), which provides:
(1) Unless restricted by the charter or bylaws of the corporation, mem-
bers of the board of directors or a committee of the board may participate
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formalistic and sometimes inconvenient constraints of the traditional
mode of a formal meeting.189
III. A NEEDED LEGISLATIVE CHANGE: PROVIDING FOR
LESS THAN THREE DIRECTORS
In the foregoing sections of this article, an attempt has been made
not only to demonstrate the dangers inherent in statutory close cor-
poration status, but also to demonstrate that almost all of its purported
advantages are available under the general corporation law. There
is, however, one important area in which the general corporation
law fails to offer what is available under Title Four. The former
requires that a corporation have at least three directors.1 40 Complying
in a meeting by means of a conference telephone or similar communications
equipment if all persons participating in the meeting can hear each other at
the same time.
(2) Participation in a meeting by these means constitutes presence in
person at the meeting.
139. It could be argued that a corporation comprised of only one or two stock-
holders may be unnecessarily encumbered by the three-person board required for a
general corporation. A partial rebuttal to such a contention is that a three-person
board could act through a quorum of two directors. CoDE § 2-408(b) (2) (ii). Never-
theless, it would seem more logical to permit a corporation of less than three stock-
holders an exemption from the traditional three-board member requirement rather
than commit it to Title Four status with its attendant disadvantages. Legislation to
effect this result in Maryland is recommended in Section III of this article infra, A
Needed Legislative Change: Providing For Less Than Three Directors. See also
Hall, supra note 7, at 358.
140. CODE § 2-402(a). Neither the origins of, nor the reasons for, the three-person
board of directors are clear. The argument has been made that when one person is a
stockholder and also fills all offices, "he may do some action in the wrong capacity
or may so ignore the corporate formalities that it becomes more likely that a court
will 'pierce the veil' and ignore the formal corporate existence. Another danger is
that if the one man director-officer-stockholder becomes ill or incapacitated, corporate
activities may be hamstrung." Hayes, Directors and Officers in the Iowa Corpora-
tion - Conclusion (Part V of A Study of Iowa Incorporation Practices), 40 IowA
L. REv. 587, 588-89 (1955). Of course corporate documents could provide for the
contingency of illness or incapacity of the so-called one-person director-officer-stock-
holder. Furthermore, it is not clear how straw directors would necessarily be in a
position to undo the hamstring imposed upon a corporation's activity by the incapacity
of its sole management person.
The concept of three director requirements has been explained in an-
other fashion:
"It is said that the Roman equivalent of the corporation required three in-
corporators. The potency of the magic number has survived into our day ....
Immemorially, the American corporation has been required to have three
directors ...."
Spoerri, One Incorporator, One Director, 19 Bus. LAW. 305, 307 (1963).
In the end, however, the reason for the three-person board requirement may
just be that the draftspersons of the original corporation statutes simply did not con-
template one-person corporate entities.
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with this requirement frequently leads to the artificiality of electing
"dummy" or "straw" directors to fill a privately-held corporation
board. Moreover, such directors, frequently spouses or compliant
friends, do not benefit the corporation by deliberate management in-
volvement, but serve only in a nominal and passive capacity.
To avoid confronting stockholders in a one- or two-person
privately-held enterprise with the choice of either electing such "silent"
directors under general corporation law or operating under statutes
such as Title Four, a minor modification of Maryland's general law
would seem to be in order. Provision must be made, as has been
done in thirty-nine jurisdictions, for reduced numerical board of di-
rector requirements. 1 4
Modification of Maryland's general corporation law standard that
"[e]ach corporation shall have at least three directors at all times"' 4
could be implemented with relative ease. It is suggested that the
statute, section 2-402, be amended to provide as follows:
(a) Minimum Number. The number of directors constituting
the entire board of directors shall not be less than three, except
that (i) before there is stock outstanding, the number of di-
rectors constituting the entire board of directors may be less than
three, but not less than one, and (ii) where there is stock out-
standing and all shares of stock of a corporation are owned
beneficially and of record by less than three stockholders, the
number of directors constituting the entire board of directors
may be less than three, but not less than the number of such
stockholders. At any time that a corporation shall no longer be
entitled to have less than three directors, as provided in this
subsection, its by-laws or charter, as hereinafter provided, shall
set forth the number of directors which shall constitute the entire
board of directors of such corporation.
Obviously, such a minimal statutory modification would permit a
privately-held corporation with a sole stockholder to have one director
and a two-stockholder entity to have a board consisting of two
members.
141. Those states which require no directors, or a minimum of one, or which
allow two directors in a two-stockholder corporation and one director in a one-person
corporation include Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa (fixed by by-laws), Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska (fixed
by by-laws), Nevada, New Hampshire (fixed by by-laws), New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. It is significant to note that in 1975 alone, three of the above states changed
from requiring at least three directors to allowing fewer.
142. CODE§ 2-402(a).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Legislative action such as that set forth in the preceding section
would modernize Maryland's general corporation law and bring it
into line with the great majority of states. More significantly, coun-
sel planning an enterprise of two or fewer stockholders would not be
forced to choose the treacherous path of deadlock statutes like Title
Four in order to avoid designation of the illusory straw board member.
Corporate planning will thus be put back into its proper perspective -
accounting for the vicissitudes of human nature through the "infinite
variations"143 permissible under the general corporation law.
143. HEN, supra note 49, § 1, at 2.
AUTHOR'S NOTE
Prior to publication of this article, copies of the galleys were cir-
culated to the members of the Corporations, Banking and Business
Section Council of the Maryland State Bar Association. Following
review of the legislation proposed in this article, the Council recom-
mended legislation similar in result but broader in scope. Tke main
distinction between the legislation proposed herein and that proposed
by the Council is that the Council's proposal allows a minimum of one
director, regardless of the number of stockholders. The Council's pro-
posed bill for submission to the Maryland Legislature on a prefiled basis
would amend section 2-402 to read as follows:
2-402. Number of directors.
(a) Number. - Each corporation shall have one or more
directors at all times.
(b) Charter provision. - A Maryland corporation shall have
the number of directors provided in its charter until changed by the
bylaws.
(c) Bylaws provision. - The bylaws may:
(i) Alter the number of directors set by the charter;
and
(ii) Authorize a majority of the entire board of directors
to alter within specified limits the number of directors set by the charter
or the bylaws, but the action may not affect the tenure of office or any
director.
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